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Through interviews and courtroom observations in a case study done in
collaboration with a community partner in two judicial districts in Minnesota,
the authors extend the scholarly conversation about critical, activist research
in business and technical communication and make pedagogical suggestions
by studying two groups who contribute to the discourse about victim rights:
judges who accept plea negotiations and make sentencing decisions and
advocates who help victims contribute, through victim impact statements,
their reactions as crime victims and their requests for certain punishments
and conditions for the crime perpetrators. The authors identify the technolo
gies of power used by each group to assert their disciplinary authority and
trace how these assertions play out in the courtroom. They conclude that by
capitalizing on the normative structures of impact statements, advocates may
actually give victims more power. Such activist research might benefit
research participants and enhance research methods.

O

f the various groups that claim agency in shaping communication in the
public arena, those that write and interpret the law and those that advocate
for people affected by those laws must negotiate sometimes differing voices
and goals. In this article, we focus on two such groups that contribute to the

discourse about victim rights: judges who accept plea negotiations and make
sentencing decisions and advocates who help victims contribute—through vic
tim impact statements (VISs)—their reactions as crime victims and their
requests for certain punishments and conditions for crime perpetrators. We
identify the technologies of power used by each group to assert disciplinary
authority and trace how these assertions play out in the courtroom. We conclude
that judges who are granted primary power in the discipline of law exercise a
legal choice to support, weigh, or restrict impact statements in the various cases
they handle. In addition, judges have in mind an informal, but established, norm
that helps determine whether an impact statement is persuasive as they decide
whether to accept a plea negotiation or which sentence to impose. Victim advo
cates, in turn, acknowledge and understand this norm, and they help victims
write VISs that will fit within the norm and, therefore, have a greater chance of
being persuasive to the court. Further, we suggest that by capitalizing on these
normative structures, victim advocates may actually deviate from those norms
to give themselves, and subsequently victims, more power.
We also situate our study within the growing body of scholarly work that
seeks to contribute to the public sphere and comment on how that goal
might affect the research methods used in such studies. We feel that such
research and classroom experiences in the public arena are essential in busi
ness and technical communication programs, particularly to help graduate
students identify and understand the technologies of power used by creators
and interpreters of public policy. The case study we present here is an
example of such experiences.
In our study of VISs then, we asked the following questions: (a) Given
the legislated right that victims have to give impact statements, how do the
concerned groups interpret that right in the sentencing hearing? (b) What
values, goals, and technologies of power appear in the interpretations of
those rights? (c) How do these perhaps conflicting interpretations, values,
goals, and technologies of power reflect the disciplinary power of each
group and influence the application of the policy that enables victims to
give impact statements? (d) What does a study of such statements con
tribute to our field, particularly in terms of education and research goals in
the public arena, and to the participants in such studies?1

Data Collection, Organization of the Study,
and Community Partnership
To answer these questions, we designed a qualitative case study and con
ducted 45-minute face-to-face interviews with 28 judges in the Fourth and

Second Judicial Districts in Minnesota (Hennepin County–Minneapolis and
Ramsey County–St. Paul, respectively) between November 2004 and May
2006. At the same time, we conducted similar interviews with 17 community
and system victim and witness advocates in both districts. In our sample,
60% of the judges were male and 40% were female; 89% were Caucasian,
7% were African American, and 4% were Hispanic; 43% had 5 to 10 years’
experience on the bench, 25% had 11 to 20 years’ experience, and 32% had
more than 20 years’ experience; and 66% were assigned to criminal and civil
cases, 17% to juvenile cases, 7% to civil cases, 3% to family cases, and 7%
served as chief judges. The advocates we interviewed were all female although
we did include one male probation officer in Hennepin County who
specialized in domestic violence and sexual assault cases; two advocates
were African American, and the rest were Caucasian. Their experience
ranged from 1 year to over 20 years on the job. Immediately after the inter
views, we transcribed them verbatim, and we each coded the transcriptions
and then compared and refined our results (see Appendix A for our inter
view questions). During the same time, we also attended 17 sentencing
hearings in a variety of cases in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties to under
stand the courtroom dynamics when an impact statement is offered, and
although in this article we focus on the interviews, we allude to the hear
ings observed when they offer insight into statements gleaned from the
interviews. During our interviews with the advocates, we established an
agreement that they would alert us whenever an impact statement was
going to be delivered in a sentence hearing. We attended the first four hear
ings together to develop and refine an observation form (see Appendix B)
and to standardize our responses, and then we divided up the observations.
Our research partner for this project was WATCH (originally called
Women at the Court House but now legally known by the acronym), a local
volunteer-based court monitoring and research organization that follows
family and sexual violence cases and provides feedback to the justice system.
WATCH provided a way for us to observe and learn about the often unseen
and subtle negotiations in the public arena. We suggested the project, and
WATCH endorsed it as part of its courtroom research initiative. Our affiliation
with WATCH opened many doors for us, particularly among the judges. For
example, judges in the Fourth District where WATCH operates were accustomed
to a public presence in their courtrooms, and over a third of them were willing
to agree to interviews regardless of their relationship with WATCH. One
judge, for example, said that she would do “anything for WATCH” (4JD6)
whereas another agreed to an interview even though he felt misunderstood
when WATCH commented on a case he had handled.2 Although WATCH

volunteers primarily monitor domestic violence and sexual assault cases,
our observations and interviews also included discourse surrounding other
person crimes such as driving while intoxicated (DWI), identity theft, and
homicide. WATCH had a definite goal in mind: to create a conversation
between judges and between judges and advocates in order to share impres
sions and reflections about how to handle impact statements and to expose
any attitudes that either served or silenced victims.
Because we knew that WATCH would publish our findings in an exten
sive report that included its own volunteers’ observations of more than 70
sentencing hearings, we designed our interview questions and observation
form to solicit primarily perceptions and stories that revealed judicial atti
tudes and advocate perceptions.3 In our judicial interviews, we focused on
sentencing decisions that the judge made (as opposed to capital cases in
which a jury would make such decisions) and on plea negotiations that the
judge would either accept, modify, or reject. We found the open-ended
questions at the end of our interviews most revealing: For example, although
all the judges remarked that sentencing guidelines were more important
than impact statements in making a sentencing decision or accepting a plea
negotiation, they all were able to recall an impact statement that did affect
a decision. From the judges’ and advocates’ descriptions of the statements,
gathered from our interviews, and our courtroom observations of judges’
integration of parts of impact statements when handing down sentences, we
were able to speculate about the persuasive features of such statements.
Once we finished our project, WATCH posted our report on its Web site
(http://www.watchmn.org/court.html), and parts of the report were also
covered by several local electronic and print media in the Twin Cities. Finally,
we knew that our research had some impact when judges and advocates told
WATCH that they had read it and expressed interest and curiosity in, and
sometimes dismay at, each other’s statements. Our report listed several
recommendations for improving judges’ and victims’ experiences with
impact statements in sentencing hearings. For example, we recommended
that “victim impact statements should be submitted well in advance of the
sentencing hearing to give judges time to read and respond to them” (p. 23)
and that
judges should remember to thank the victim for coming forward, and, if they
are comfortable, to compliment the victim on her courage in doing so. Given
how healing and empowering this might be for the victim, judges should also
consider mentioning the impact statement and any specifics from that state
ment when handing down the sentence. (p. 24)

Although we considered ourselves researchers in conducting this study,
WATCH’s advocacy goal influenced the version of the report we presented to
it and we were excited about making positive changes in the courtroom.
That is, understanding WATCH as an advocacy group moved us to think in
terms of further promoting those goals and, in doing so, to step outside the
academic world with which we were most familiar—one that can often be
rather insular. Although working with WATCH was gratifying in itself, one of
the most rewarding aspects of our research came from sharing the results of
our project with this organization. Our understanding of the VIS, based on
and coupled with what we learned from our research, interviews, and obser
vations, was viewed by WATCH as pertinent to its own mission and the
issues its volunteers encounter in their work on a daily basis. In short, working
with WATCH served as a reminder that merging advocacy work with academic
work is indeed possible and that academic work can have a positive influence
both within and outside the academy. In fact, thinking of academic work in
terms of its capacity to do advocacy work, and wanting to share that perspec
tive with colleagues and students alike, is what fuels much of our energy for
research and teaching. Nonetheless, we encountered challenges in working
with a community partner such as WATCH. These challenges centered
primarily on the need to maintain carefully established relationships within
the legal and advocacy communities. In conducting the judicial and advocate
interviews, for example, we needed to maintain the respectful relationships that
WATCH had developed. We ensured confidentiality and tried to provide
some outcomes from our study that might be useful to those parties involved
with it. But, overall, the greatest benefit of this study gave us our greatest
challenge in conducting it: We were doing academic work that became
advocacy work, so we had to balance our interests with those of our research
partner in improving the system while describing the nature of that system.
In presenting our study here, we first capture the context of the study,
aligning it with other critical activist research in business and technical
communication and review the legislated statutes and sentencing guidelines
that are interpreted in the courtroom, placing them within the historical
context of the victim rights movement from which WATCH’s work origi
nates. Next, we describe the theoretical framework for the study, based on
Foucault’s (1979) theories of disciplinary authority and technologies of
power and De Certeau’s (1984) understanding of strategies and tactics, both of
which guided our interpretation of the courtroom discourse about VISs. Last,
we examine the data from our interviews and observations to capture the tech
nologies of power in the judiciary and advocate realms through that courtroom
discourse. We conclude by speculating what this study can contribute to our

understanding and pedagogical goals of research on public policy and the
public arena.

The Scholarly, Legal, and Public
Policy Context of the Study
In writing this article, we are very keen on sharing with colleagues and
graduate students the idea that academic work can indeed be understood as
advocacy work and that academic work can have an impact not only within
but also outside the academy. Recent scholarship in business and technical
communication has demonstrated the ways in which researchers may use
field-based methods such as interviewing or participant observation to
better understand the discourse practices of particular communities or
organizations and subsequently to influence more reflective discursive
practices within those settings. Faber (1998), for example, interested in
better understanding the factors underpinning organizational change,
viewed organizations as inherently “discursive products” and identified
five rhetorical factors that constitute a “discursive model of change” (p. 219).
This model can subsequently be of use to “distressed organizations”
undergoing downsizing or implementing hierarchical changes, as well as
to organizations wishing to implement organizational changes related to
identity construction (p. 233). Implicit in Faber’s study is the idea that
business and technical communication researchers can play an integral
role in partnering with organizations to help influence internal decision
making. Researchers who partner with organizations for particular pur
poses can offer contextualized understandings of local discursive prac
tices, and they can describe the ways in which certain rhetorical strategies
may contribute to those practices in order to influence or shed light on pol
icy changes. In this sense, the business and technical communication
researcher becomes engaged in critical advocacy-based research that seeks
to influence or inform policy change.
In “Saving the Great Lakes: Public Participation in Environmental Policy,”
Waddell (1996) was also concerned with site-based research that aims to set
out a model for “enhancing public participation in environmental and science
policy disputes” (p. 158). Although Waddell’s study predates Faber’s (1998),
and the subject matter differs greatly, Waddell may be understood as implicitly
arguing for an activist research program in which the public communicates
with policy makers to participate in local decision making. In what some
consider a landmark essay in environmental rhetoric, Waddell examined the

influence of “public testimony at the [1991] International Joint Commission’s
Sixth Biennial Meeting on Great Lakes Water Quality” (p. 144). Waddell
concluded by advocating for a social constructionist model of policy making
in which “risk communication is not a process whereby values, beliefs, and
emotions are communicated only from the public and technical information is
communicated only from the technical experts” (p. 142) but that necessarily
entails the sharing of information and involves open communication between
all participants.
Also serving to bridge the communication gap between experts and lay
audiences, Barton’s (2004) research on the discourse practices of medical
oncologists in discussing prognosis with their patients helps identify “prog
nosis as a problem in the discourse of medicine” (p. 96). That is, her
research suggests that medical oncologists tend to avoid or background the
difficult discussion of prognosis by “shifting the communicative responsi
bility for prognosis to patients and their families” (p. 106). Not only did
Barton ground her research in observational fieldwork, but equally impor
tant, she also presented the results of her work to “medical practitioners in
an effort to establish a mutual understanding of professional practices and,
perhaps, move toward critically informed changes in those practices.” In
doing so, she suggested, “our critical engagement will not only be richer
but also be more likely to ring true to the audience of the discipline as a
basis for change” (p. 106).
In a somewhat related study, Schuster (2006) interviewed clients of a
freestanding birth center operated by a local direct-entry midwife, who pro
vides a space and shares a discourse that helps those clients resist the hege
monic medical messages about the risks involved in birth outside the
hospital. Schuster’s interviews reveal the strategies that such clients use in
choosing the space in which they give birth and in managing pain without
drugs or medical intervention. Both Barton (2004) and Schuster expressed
an idea that we too wish to emphasize here, one that we see as an impor
tant contribution to activist research in business and technical communica
tion—that sharing the results of field-based research with research partners
and participants may help not only to bridge the gap between the researcher
and the “audience of the discipline” but also to initiate changes in the
practices under discussion. Thus, sharing research results with participants
is a valuable component of activist research in business and technical
communication.
Grabill (2000), in his work with the Atlanta Planning Council and their
local processes around HIV–AIDS policy making, explicitly positioned the
technical writing researcher as activist. Grabill understood “policy making as

a function of institutionalized rhetorical processes” and took “an activist
research stance in order to help generate the knowledge necessary to intervene
in those processes” (p. 31). Grabill argued that activist research should afford
“power and position to others in order to achieve a goal,” that “participants
must benefit from the processes of research just as the researcher benefits,” and
that “outsiders [should] be invited to participate in local problem solving.”
Last, Grabill maintained that activist research must involve “mutual knowledge
construction . . . that participants have a fundamental opportunity to participate
in analysis, reflection, and meaning making” (p. 34). In our own work with
WATCH, we also strongly believed that the organization should benefit from
our research process, and we assisted it in refining the project and com
pleting a plan to disseminate its results.
To understand further the goals of WATCH and this study, we must rec
ognize the context of the victim rights movement and of legal and public
policy debate concerning VISs. The legislated right to give impact state
ments originated within the victim rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s
in the United States. This movement generated efforts such as rape crisis
centers, victim and witness advocacy programs, hotlines and shelters for
battered women, victim compensation programs, mandatory arrest policies
in domestic violence cases, restitution programs, stalking statutes, commu
nity notification laws, the online national sex offender registry, and amber
alerts. Other governmental and grassroots efforts and organizations within
the movement include the National Organization for Victim Assistance
(founded in 1975); the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault (1978);
the Crime Victims’ Legal Advocacy Institute (1979), renamed the Victims’
Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR) in 1981; Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (1980); state-sponsored Crime Victims’ Bill of Rights (the first was
passed by Wisconsin in 1980); Crime Victims’ Rights Week, created by
President Reagan in 1981, and the Task Force on Victims of Crime that fol
lowed in 1982; the U.S. Department of Justice Office for Victims of Crime
(1983); the National Center for Victims of Crime (1985), which works with
over 10,000 grassroots organizations and criminal justice agencies; the
National Aging Resource Center on Elder Abuse (1988); and the Violence
Against Women Act, which authorized, in 1994, more than one billion dol
lars for funding programs to combat violence against women and then, in
2000, extensive funding for rape prevention and education programs.
WATCH, founded in 1992, responded to a perceived need of victims to
have a public presence in the courtroom. In part, however, all these efforts
were meant to ensure that victims had a voice in criminal proceedings
against their abusers.

The right to give an impact statement is legislated in a Minnesota statute
(Right to Submit Statement at Sentencing, 2006). Impact statements have a
number of purposes: to increase victim satisfaction and closure, to educate
the court on the burden crime places on the victim, to allow the victim to
react to the proposed sentence, to better determine restitution orders, and to
balance the information the court receives on the defendant’s background
(Sobieski, 2004, para. 6). Community advocates in the Twin Cities, such as the
Tubman Family Alliance Center and Casa de Esperanza, provide shelter, as
well as help in negotiating the legal process, particularly for orders of pro
tection for domestic violence victims. Other community groups such as the
Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women and Battered Women’s Legal
Advocacy Group focus on education and system change. System advocates,
such as those affiliated with the County Attorney Offices in the Fourth and
Second Judicial Districts in Minnesota, help victims of a variety of person
crimes—anything from identity theft to homicide—negotiate the legal system
and provide templates and models of VISs. Both community and system
advocates accompany victims to sentencing hearings and will read, edit,
and even, if the victim prefers, deliver the impact statement orally during
the hearing.
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have affirmed the right to give an impact
statement (see Payne v. Tennessee, 1991). Despite this decision, whether
impact statements are prejudicial and inflammatory in all cases, and therefore
a violation of a defendant’s eighth amendment rights, is still debated by schol
ars (see e.g., Arrigo & Williams, 2003; Bandes, 1996; Burr, 2002-2003;
Schneider, 1992). Other scholars have asked whether victims do feel better
after giving an impact statement, and their findings vary from victims get
ting little satisfaction (see e.g., Bandes, 2000; Hillenbrand & Smith, 1989;
Karmen, 1992) to victims experiencing great satisfaction if the judge
acknowledges and even responds to the statement by citing the victim’s
own words in rendering the sentence (see e.g., Erez, 1991; Erez, 1999;
Villmoare & Neto, 1987).
Similar studies ask whether impact statements have an effect on sentencing
decisions. Greene (1999), for example, found that information about the
personal qualities of the deceased created “a more favorable impression” of
the victim than that created by opinion evidence alone or no victim impact
information (p. 344; see also Greene & Koehring, 1998; Nadler & Rose,
2003). Ludwig (2001), on the other hand, found that impact statements
did not have a significant effect on decisions to depart from the presumed
sentence, to sentence according to aggravated or mitigated guidelines, or to
issue restitution orders (p. ii; see also Erez & Laster, 1999; Erez & Tontodonato,

1990; Henley, Davis, & Smith, 1994; Jackson, 1994; Myers & Arbuthnot,
1999). Moreover, Sanders, Hoyle, Morgan, and Cape (2001) explained that
impact statements have little effect because most cases are “typical cases,”
that is, “the impact of the crime on the victim is as one would expect given
the nature and seriousness of the crime,” and any significant harm will be
revealed before the sentencing hearing, in the form of witness statements,
for example (p. 454). The scholarly debate continues over the challenge
VISs might pose to constitutional rights, the satisfaction that victims feel
when giving a VIS, and the effect such VISs might have on sentencing
decisions and plea negotiations.
Finally, Minnesota is one of many states that have adopted sentencing
guidelines for felony convictions.4 Particularly important to our study is the
potential tension between the presumed sentencing guidelines and the leg
islated right to give an impact statement in cases in which the victim wants
to influence the sentence. According to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission (2006), the purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to “establish
rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing
disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are pro
portional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the
offender’s criminal history.” The sentencing guidelines take into account
two dimensions, offense severity and criminal history, and departures from
the presumptive sentences “should be made only when substantial and
compelling circumstances exist” (p. 2). Recently judges’ options were fur
ther limited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blakely v. Washington (2004). In
states with sentencing guidelines, a jury must now determine beyond a rea
sonable doubt whether aggravating factors, other than prior convictions,
exist as facts before a judge may use these factors to impose a harsher sen
tence than indicated in the sentencing guidelines, or the defendant must
waive his “Blakely rights” in a plea negotiation that includes a harsher sen
tence. Therefore, although victims have the right to give an impact state
ment, they enter into a legal system that is still negotiating how to respond
to these often-emotional statements that may disrupt a system supposedly
based on rationality and neutrality.

Theoretical Framework
In this study, we relied on Foucault’s (1990) theories of power and
knowledge systems and his definitions of technologies of power, as well as

on De Certeau’s (1984) notion of strategies and tactics, to understand the
disciplinary authority and interactions of judges and advocates who
respond when victims choose to give impact statements. To Foucault, law
is only “the terminal point” that those in power might take; instead, he pro
posed that to understand the nuances of power relations, we must identify
“the multiplicity of force relations immanent in their sphere in which they
operate and which constitute their own organization” (p. 92). In other
words, we might do well to consider the dynamics that function to perpet
uate and sustain what counts as a normal, and thereby acceptable and per
suasive, VIS. That is, the normative structures governing what counts as an
acceptable impact statement do not come from nowhere. They are a prod
uct of, for one, judges’ attempts to reconcile their own disciplinary author
ity and adherence to state guidelines with victims’ requests for particular
sentences or punishments for defendants’ crimes. Victim advocates func
tion as intermediaries who not only work within the system but also help
victims articulate the effects of a crime in an attempt to influence the sen
tence, feel empowered and heard, and, ultimately, heal. These complex
relationships are not always stable and are thus subject to “ceaseless strug
gles and confrontations,” forms of resistance that are never external to
power but instead part of the “interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile rela
tions” (pp. 92, 95). To say that these relationships are “nonegalitarian,” how
ever, is not necessarily to say that they are adversarial—they may or may not be.
What they are, though, is negotiable. And we are interested in the many
points of negotiation in those relationships.
De Certeau (1984) also addressed the ways in which particular groups
negotiate, through the conscious or unconscious implementation of strategies
and tactics, a balance of power. For example, judges’ adherence to state
guidelines, or even the existence of such guidelines in the first place, may be
understood as consistent with De Certeau’s notion of the “strategy.” Judges’
negotiations of these guidelines with the needs and requests of victims then
work as a
calculation of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject
with will and power [such as the courts] can be isolated . . . [and] delimited
as its own and . . . serve as the base from which relations with an exteriority
composed of targets or threats . . . can be managed. (p. 36)

An “exteriority” is not necessarily a “target” or a “threat” per se; rather, an
exteriority is an organization that works both with and against the more
powerful subject, in this case, the court system. An exterior group, such as

the victim advocates, for example, might then execute what De Certeau
referred to as “tactics,” or
calculated action[s] determined by the absence of a proper locus. No delim
itation of an exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for
autonomy. The space of the tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play
on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by the law of a foreign
power. (p. 37)

In other words, victim advocates must work within the terrain of the court sys
tem, recognizing the sentencing guidelines and VIS norms established by
judges. Furthermore, victim advocates occupy the space of the other by using
those norms to inform their own advocacy work and thus empower the victim.
Foucault (1990) also understood normalization as a necessary compo
nent for maintaining, resisting, and negotiating disciplinary power. He
explored the tension between, on one hand, “the rule of optimal specifica
tion”—or the legal impulse to rely on “an exhaustive, explicit code” of
“defining crimes and fixing penalties,” such as Minnesota’s sentencing
guidelines—and, on the other hand, individualization that responds to such
things as the “status of the offender” (pp. 98, 99). Rather than applying such
impulses to punish to theories of the law or moral choices, or the institu
tions based on these theories or choices, Foucault (1979) recommended
analyzing the “modalities according to which the power to punish is exer
cised,” that is, the “technologies of power” (p. 131). Foucault proposed that
such punishment depends on normalization. So in this study, we must reach
below the surface of the sentencing guidelines and legislation to understand
the relationship between the judges who must weigh the VISs and the advo
cates who help prepare them. In rhetorical terms, what is determined to be
normal is persuasive; what is considered to be abnormal is not. More
specifically, in hearing VISs, judges establish, wittingly or unwittingly, a
norm for what counts as the acceptable, thereby persuasive, impact state
ment. Advocates recognize the acceptance of these norms and work within
them, sometimes subtly subverting the disciplinary mechanisms of the court
system in order to help victims compose what they know will be the most
well-received impact statement possible, thus helping to empower the vic
tim. “Discipline,” then, according to Foucault (1979),
may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type
of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments,
techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an
“anatomy” of power, a technology. (p. 215)

Those technologies of power, those negotiations and dynamics, those strate
gies and tactics, are what we identify in our observations and interviews and
believe that students and scholars of business and technical communication
must understand in public settings. These interviews and observations were
vital in helping us discern the nuances of the dynamics between the various
groups involved in writing and interpreting VISs, and we feel strongly that
methods in business and technical communication should include inter
viewing and observing individuals and constituencies as they interpret
these texts.

Technologies of Power in the
Judiciary and Advocate Realms
The judicial discourse we captured, through interviews and observa
tions, often contains assertions of the judges’ authority backed by the prin
ciples of the law. Judicial choices in sentencing may also be articulated as
limited by sentencing guidelines—a “rhetoric of inevitability,” as Bandes
(1996) called it (p. 378; see also, Lutz, 1988). This authority and rhetoric
of inevitability in fact work together to deflect arguments against a sen
tencing decision and establish norms for what counts as a persuasive VIS.
In addition, the plea negotiation and the presentencing investigation, as
authoritative knowledge systems in a case, along with the sentencing guide
lines then have the potential to cast any impact statement as unnecessary in
terms of sentencing decisions. Although victim advocates are aware that
judges generally place less emphasis on the impact statement than on other
factors, the judges have a norm in mind for what counts as the acceptable
VIS. Although the majority of victim advocates note that “very rarely does
an impact statement affect the sentence because its typically been decided
already” (AHS5), they also acknowledge the huge benefit of the statement
for the victim. Advocates will let victims know that, in general, the purpose
of the impact statement is not necessarily to influence the sentence; rather,
“The power really is just in the victim being able to stand up and say, ‘You
did this to me, it was wrong, this is how it affected me, and this is what I
think should happen to you for doing that to me’” (AHS12). At the same
time, as we describe later, advocates also understand the features that make
a VIS persuasive in the eyes of the court, and they will do everything in
their power to help victims craft such a persuasive statement. If the VIS is
deemed persuasive by the judge, then it has a chance to function as doubly

powerful, both as a means for catharsis for the victim and also as a tool for
influencing the sentence.
In our interviews, then, we encountered judges who asserted their authority
in sentencing decisions, often to explain the reason for the sentence or its
terms and to show that the VIS did not play a primary role in their decision
making. One judge, for example, said, “And I want that clear to the victims
as well as the defendant. But your input is welcome, but the decision
remains with the court” (2JD4). This decision-making status as conveyed to
the victim is also made clear to the defendant—and many judges, as they
deliver the terms of the sentence, will choose to echo back to the defendant
the contents of an impact statement in order to “give that voice from a position
of authority” (4JD7). For example, one judge told the defendant the
following:
If you don’t do the things I am telling you to do, whether it’s a treatment
program or no contact or whatever . . . I am going to put you in jail, you are
not going to have work release, and you are going to sit there and do every
day that I can make you do. (4JD17)

The foundation of this status rests, many judges assert, within the principles
of the law, which they summarize in a way that may seem dismissive of the
victim’s individual perspective: “An individual does not get to dispense indi
vidual justice. It’s got to fit within the scheme of what is acceptable in the
community” (4JD18). Here, to borrow from De Certeau’s model (1984), we
may see how the court system functions as willful and powerful, as an insti
tution that can “serve as the base from which” those cast in the role of other
“can be managed” (p. 36). The state, not the individual, is the victim; the
crime is against society, and retribution rather than retaliation is the goal of
justice. And so the victims and their advocates enter a courtroom in which the
judges might assume a position of authority, based on their understanding of
the function of the law, and the impact statement is clearly secondary: “I listen
to all this and I am polite to people because the statute obligates me to, but,
so far as I know, it doesn’t influence me” (4JD21).
Again, in addition to this assertion of authority, judges describe sentencing
guidelines as placing reasonable limits on that authority, as providing an
objective and equitable framework for their decision making. As one judge
said, “You can really have the empathy; you can feel the pain. But again,
our justice system with the sentencing guidelines really does take out your
visceral reactions to things” (2JD1). Another judge said the following:

I am a great believer in them [guidelines]. They are supposed to limit dispar
ity; they are supposed to promote proportionality, and I think they do. God
only knows where we would all go without them. So they give me a starting
point. (4JD6)

These judges seem to view the guidelines as a sort of overarching strategy for
decision making—one that delimits the territory in which action is possi
ble (De Certeau, 1984, p. 36).
Many of the judges we interviewed and observed also attributed their ulti
mate sentencing decision for the crime to the plea agreement or the prosecutor’s
decision to offer a settlement, another way in which the rhetoric of inevitability
is used to justify a sentence decision or plea. “The prosecutor knows the
case so much better than the judge ever does,” said one judge (2JD1).
Therefore, judges state that they seldom “go back on the deal” (2JD5). The
presentencing recommendation, which the judge reads before accepting the plea
negotiation, contains information about the effect of the crime on the victim
and the victim’s response to the plea, but that information is recorded and
perhaps interpreted by the probation officer. So, as one judge said, “when
you get to the impact statements, even the ones that are particularly moving
and heartfelt and emotional, they aren’t really telling a judge anything he
didn’t know or already assume” (4JD14). Judicial discourse about impact
statements, then, reinforces the power and knowledge system of the law.
Once having established this authority and suggested this inevitability,
however, some judges do view disciplinary action as a negotiation involving
a constellation of variables, some of which may include the impact statement
and some of which may include additional details about the case, the victim,
or the defendant. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances do allow a judge
to depart from sentencing guidelines. The defendant’s past history, age and
mental health, patterns of abuse, and possible rehabilitation, as well as the
nature of the offense and the brutality of the crime, are all possible circumstances
that affect the disposition (jail or probation) and duration of the sentence, and
many defendants do waive their Blakely rights in plea negotiations in order
to avoid possibly receiving even more severe penalties after a trial. When
probed, then, most judges did recall at least one case in which the VIS
caused them to reconsider a sentencing decision or plea, agreeing that there
are certainly instances in which the impact statement can influence the
sentence. Moreover, judges almost always acknowledged the potential
emotional benefit of an impact statement to victims: “It gives them an
opportunity to say, ‘You know, here’s something bad that happened to me,’
and it somehow has a cleansing effect on them” (2JD2). Although the victim

must address the judge, not the defendant, when delivering a statement, the
impact statement does give the victim a chance to tell the person, albeit
indirectly, “You hurt me, and I feel bad. And I want you to understand that
I am hurting” (2JD6).
Advocates, too, while acknowledging the limited influence of the impact
statement, often returned to the idea of the impact statement as a liberating
tool for empowerment and validation. Many advocates felt that it really
depends on the judge—that some judges “really try to take into consideration
what the victim is saying” (ARC9). Interestingly, one advocate even described
a case in which the impact letter deviated from the norm in that it was about
10 pages long, which is not traditional. The judge “took a recess from the
hearing to go back and read all 10 pages,” and then she “came back out on the
record and she kicked the plea deal because based on everything the victim
was telling her in the impact statement, she didn’t feel that she could support
the plea negotiation” (AHS8). That example of an impact statement that
deviated from its generic norm in a way that influenced the judge’s decision
shows that impact statements can occasionally influence the sentence. But
as this advocate put it, “That is the .01%” (AHS8). Notably, this advocate felt
that the impact statement, being 10 pages long, did not fit the “traditional”
model of the genre. Perhaps advocates’ understanding of the normative
structures that govern what counts as an influential impact statement actually
allowed such a nontraditional VIS to function persuasively. In other words,
in understanding the norm, advocates may be able to subtly subvert the
norm in order to help make the victim’s voice heard. Although we can only
speculate on the precise features that made this particular 10-page impact
statement persuasive to the judge, we can safely presume that victim advocates’
awareness of and ability to work within and against the strategies of the
court system aided in making that “.01%” an actuality.

Features of a Persuasive Impact Statement
In our interviews, judges generally identified features that might make
impact statements persuasive regardless of how objective and limited these
judges were in making their sentencing decisions. An impact statement can
cause a judge to rethink a plea:
I have had cases where I was planning to honor a plea agreement, and then
after victim impact, I rejected it. That is not typical; it’s unusual, but it has
happened. And I actually changed my practice after that, and I told people
whether I accept a plea agreement depends on the entire process, including
the victim impact statement. (4JD22)

More commonly, however, an impact statement might affect the conditions of
probation, causing the judge to order anger-management treatment, drug
and alcohol supervision, domestic violence counseling, or such. Moreover,
although the advocates generally agreed that the impact statement is
unlikely to have a real “impact on the judge in terms of sentencing,” they
clearly agreed that the work of the impact statement transcends the actual
sentencing. By giving an impact statement, one advocate said, “You will be
giving a gift to society because you are educating every single person in that
courtroom—the court reporter, the clerk, the total strangers, the judge, the
defense attorney, the prosecutors.” That is, after hearing the impact state
ment, they are no longer going to view the victim as “a case, they are going
to see a human being. They are going to go, ‘Wow, I cannot imagine what
that would be like if it happened to me’” (ARC17). Therefore, in our inter
views and observations, we attempted to capture those traits of a persuasive
impact statement.
Interestingly, for judges, VISs are deemed persuasive if they argue for
leniency or mercy, provide new information on a case, support the principles
of the law, display insight into the crime or relationship with the defendant,
or offer a vivid account of the crime that distinguishes it from the typical or
average crime of its sort. One judge, for example, described the sort of
novel point of view that a victim might offer in an impact statement: “I learn
of the victim’s injury and impact in . . . several dimensions that have never
been flashed before my brain before, and I will reject negotiations on those
cases” (4JD6). Likewise, victim advocates understand that a persuasive
impact statement should provide insights into the relationship and the crime
that would otherwise be unavailable to the court:
We don’t want them to get a whole lot into the incident . . . that’s already
been established. But maybe where they were, the hopes, the dreams they had
for this relationship [in a domestic assault case], how it started out and maybe
how did it get this way, how it has affected them, maybe what they have been
reduced to because of this. (AHC14)

The most persuasive impact statements seem to be those in which the vic
tim describes relationship dynamics, in domestic assault cases, and personal
accounts, in other crimes, that the judge would otherwise be unable to see
or understand.
Consistent with this idea were the words of one judge, who noted how
other victims were able to make their “particular case different” by describing
details that would otherwise have remained unknown; for example, “‘I have

had to do therapy,’ or ‘I broke my engagement,’ or ‘my husband couldn’t
deal with me being raped, and we are divorced’” (4JD10). Another judge
described why he imposed a more lenient sentence on a father who, while
on drugs, threw his child against the wall to stop the child from crying. In
this case, the mother asked for treatment rather than jail time: “She really
loved him, and I think that she was pregnant with another child, that she
would suffer, and the new child would suffer without having a father, that
he was exceedingly remorseful over what happened” (4JD16). One judge,
however, described how appreciative judges are when victims agree with
the sentence through their insight into the ways the court must protect
public safety:
I just think we probably are all a little more comfortable if we hear the victim
say, “This was awful, terrible, and yet I know that society would be better off
. . . if this guy gets treatment as opposed to getting prison.” (4JD10)

In such cases, the VIS confirms the court’s decision rather than influ
ences it.
As we discovered in our interviews, then, victims who are successful in
influencing a sentencing decision or affecting a plea negotiation have to be
skillful rhetors and work within the norms for VISs that are informally estab
lished by the courts: They must argue that the crime had affected them more
than the “typical” crime would have, that they have special insight into the
defendant, or that they understand that a plea may be accepted that involves
probation instead of prison time but that probation conditions might be a
better way to correct or monitor the defendant’s behavior. In their expecta
tions for the VIS, then, judges shape what counts as an acceptable and thereby
persuasive VIS. But also, by understanding and working within these norms,
victim advocates perpetuate and sustain the norm while they use that under
standing to help victims write the most persuasive VIS possible.
Nonetheless, delivering an impact statement is a difficult task because,
on one hand, as many advocates agreed, “the ones that are probably the most
compelling and the most powerful are the ones where people are really
willing to open up and really talk about their pain” (AHS12). On the other
hand, though, most advocates agreed that “the more sensible you come
across, the more seriously you are taken” (AHS1). The standard for the
well-received impact statement is therefore high. Advocates and victims
alike have the difficult job of achieving what may seem like an impossible
balance. That is, judges seem to want personal information and insights
about the relationship conveyed in the impact statement, but this informa
tion must be presented in a balanced tone that is not overly emotional.

Advocates then recognize that for a judge to view an impact statement
as credible, it must achieve a delicate balance between emotion and more
objective insights into the crime. Because that is often easier said than done,
advocates will work closely with victims, providing templates and models
of VISs, to construct a statement that the victim feels comfortable with and
that the advocate feels will be well received by the court. Here, advocates
function as the other and “play on and with a terrain imposed upon [them]”
by the authority of the court system (De Certeau, 1984, p. 36). They exercise
tactics that work within and against the normative structures established by
the courts. One advocate saw the need for a persuasive VIS as also rooted
in the need to protect the genre and its ability to help future victims:
There are things they can say in their impact statements but there are certainly
things they cannot say in their impact statements too. The court is pretty clear
on that, and we try to educate them so that they are not doing something that
they are not going to be allowed to do or that could endanger possible future
victim impact statements. (AHS6)

The impact statement, then, not only functions as an advocacy tool but also
as a technology of power in its own right—one that works with and against the
system to assert and retain its disciplinary authority through its proper adher
ence to and subtle subversion of the normative structure of the VIS.
Another advocate acknowledged the need to keep the tone of the statement
balanced—again, working within the system while also integrating the
victim’s voice in a manner acceptable to the judge:
I let them know, “I want you to be as open and honest as you are willing to
be.” . . . “You are welcome to talk about him but the comments have to be
directed to the court,” and then [there are] guidelines about being respectful
too. (AHS12)

Advocates noted that victims’ requests for sentencing should “be reason
able” and that when reading the impact statement, it’s “okay to cry, and it’s
okay to be emotional, but you don’t want to yell. You don’t want to talk in
half sentences” (AHS1). Advocates also noted that impact statements tend
to work best when they are written or prepared ahead of time. Impact state
ments, then, must be carefully crafted, respectful, and articulate. The need
to work within these expectations is important not only to ensure that the
victim is heard but also to retain the disciplinary authority of the VIS as a
viable knowledge system, as a technology of power that helps negotiate the
balance between the victim’s need to be heard and the judge’s need to retain

authority and work within the normative structures of the court—structures
that the judges themselves perpetuate and sustain.

Judicial Demeanor in the Courtroom
During the sentencing hearing itself, judges struggle with how to respond
to VISs. Advocates, having witnessed a wide range of judicial demeanor in
the courtroom, understand and corroborate this point. Within the hearings
we observed and in the recollections of hearings conveyed in interviews, we
found that negotiations were again at play in the courtroom when VISs
were presented.
Most judges confirm that they offer victims at least nonverbal assurances
that they are listening to them, and some go beyond those assurances to
incorporate the VIS in the imposition of the sentence. As one judge said, “I
look them in the eye. I don’t write notes. I try to show that I am interested,
and I want to accommodate them, and I am listening to what they say” (4JD16).
Moreover, during a February 2005 criminal sexual assault hearing, we
observed the judge tell the victim that she was a brave, good person and that
she did the right thing.5 Consistent with this point, most advocates cited
making eye contact, displaying active listening, and providing validating
comments as among the best things a judge can do to make the victim feel
heard. As one advocate put it:
I love the eye contact, and the victim might not even be aware of it because
she is shaking, holding her paper, trying to read. . . . Certainly when they
[judges] say things like, “I just want to thank you for your courage. I know
that was hard for you,” I just think that’s huge in helping her heal from it all.
(AHS3)

What can be most validating, though, as another advocate explained, is
when the judge will say things to the defendant that the victim would like
to be able to say herself:
Judges have a lot to say at sentencing hearings to the defendant, and depend
ing on how moved they have been by what this person did, sometimes they
say what the victim would like to say themselves but can’t. Things like, “. . .
I can’t believe how much damage you have caused here.” (ARS16)

An advocate said, for example, that a victim once told her that the judge’s
words, in acknowledging her statement, were “balm for her soul” (ARS16).
This impression was confirmed in more than one sentencing hearing. In one

hearing, for example, the victim’s brother, for whom English was a second
language, struggled to express his loss. The judge confirmed that his state
ment was heard by saying that she was “aware of how wonderful his sister
was and how much she had cared for her friends and family” (May 10,
2005). Another judge, who addressed a 9-year-old victim of sexual assault
whose teacher described in an impact statement that the young victim had
lost her confidence, was well aware that he could use his status to try to
restore that confidence: “So I used my power and my pulpit to say, ‘You are
a courageous young woman, and you are a strong young woman, and I
want you to know this is not your fault’” (4JD22). He ordered the defen
dant to pay restitution for the victim’s counseling for the rest of her life. But
these comments are still considered crossing the line for many judges.
So, judges may choose to remain silent because they feel ill-equipped to
know what to say to victims: “I have trouble with that. I often times don’t
know what to say” (4JD1). This response is a survival tactic for some; for
instance, one judge said, “I think I am able to put things behind me in order
to just keep living. I seem to be able to finish something and be done with it
and not have it haunt me too long” (4JD2). This detachment, of course, does
not go unnoticed by others in the courtroom. One victim advocate, for
example, stated that during particularly emotional impact statements, judges
“either get pulled in or they are pushed away” (AHC14); they succumb to the
expressions of pain and grief, or they work twice as hard to resist them
(AHC14). Advocates’ awareness and understanding of the dynamics of
judicial demeanor and the attitudes and beliefs that influence it serve as an
additional variable that informs their understanding of the role of impact
statements. As another advocate put it, “There are a lot of judges who, you
know, survive this work by building this wall, and they don’t really want to
be moved. They see it as having a bias” (ARC17). Although advocates
frequently concede that judges play a difficult role in the process, they are not
necessarily expressing opposition to judges’ demeanor when they make com
ments such as that one. Rather, they are acknowledging the various perspec
tives and often-difficult positions of judges. Advocates then use their prior
knowledge of judicial demeanor in the courtroom as yet another means to
strengthen their own work and, ultimately, help empower the victim.
Many judges, however, are hesitant to respond verbally to an impact
statement not because they have built a wall, per se, but because they fear that
such a response may diminish their authority or control of their courtrooms.
One judge, for example, said he doesn’t respond verbally to the victim’s
statement “because I have to stay objective, and the way I show my objec
tivity is by not taking sides” (2JD2). Another judge stated that she refrains

from commenting because she cannot control the victim’s reactions to her
comments:
I just listen. Usually I don’t say too much because you just really never know
what to say because whatever you say could be taken wrong, and I don’t want
anyone to think that I am judging what they say or demeaning them. (4JD14)

One judge explained that he has to distinguish carefully between his own
emotional response and his legal discourse, as he described one comment
he made in a homicide case:
“One of the things that happens in our lives is that our parents die . . . that’s
the natural order of things. But there is no consolation of a parent losing a
child. Your last thought before you die . . . will be of this child and what hap
pened to it. . . .” So I have all sorts of consolatory speeches in my repertoire,
but none of it has anything to do with the criminal law. (4JD21)

Finally, this distinction between legal and emotional discourse led a judge
to suppress his response to victims:
I think that the informal training we get with the victim impact statements is
that judges don’t really comment on the victim impact statement, and that can
be very difficult because . . . it just seems like common decency to express
your sorrow and condolence. (4JD2)

In other cases, however, judges were simply not able to maintain this
resolve. In one hearing, for example, four family members gave impact
statements in which they described their loss when a young relative had
been killed in a driving while intoxicated case. She had always wanted to
get married and had overcome physical and mental challenges in order to
be able to do so, but then on her first wedding anniversary, she was killed
by a driver impaired by drugs. The court clerk, the prosecutor, the defen
dant, and the judge all cried during the hearing (April 15, 2006).
Judges, then, struggle to find a response to impact statements that fits
their own sense of appropriate legal discourse, control, authority, and
human decency. And as advocates noted, victims for whom catharsis rests
on the judge’s ability to express emotion may be most disappointed during
sentencing hearings conducted by judges who feel that emotion and reason
are separate entities, who feel compelled to suppress their own emotional
responses, or who have become numb to impact statements in general. One
advocate told how this lack of emotional response complicates her ability
to assist the victim:

I tried to prepare the client . . . they are crying and emotional, and the people
with them are crying and emotional, and then to see this judge just kind of like
sitting there, I think that this is really hard for them to deal with. (AHC10)

Finally, in some cases we observed that the judge maintained a formal
and objective persona during the hearing but communicated informally and
even emotionally after the hearing. During a hearing in a third-degree crim
inal sexual conduct case, for example, the victim conveyed in her impact
statement a sense of her trauma and survival in saying to other potential vic
tims, “Don’t be afraid when something like this happens,” but be strong and
courageous (April 25, 2006). She described how her life had gotten better, and
she thanked the police officer that had helped her at the time of the incident.
After the hearing, the judge walked out into the gallery to speak to the victim,
whom he recognized from her own appearances in drug court, and praised
her for how far she had come. Another judge followed the mother of a vic
tim into the hallway after a hearing. In her impact statement, the mother had
described the severity of the attacks on her daughter. The defendant had
attacked the daughter five times before, and, according to the complaint, in
this latest attack, he had broken out the victim’s teeth and battered her beyond
recognition. The mother described how she feared for her daughter’s life
because the daughter was drug and alcohol addicted and unable to leave the
relationship (March 31, 2006). The judge, who had maintained the order for
protection but, despite having imposed a sentence that was more severe than
the guidelines suggested, could impose only 180 days in the workhouse,
offered to help the victim’s mother protect her daughter in “any way” she
could, and she praised her for preparing the impact statement. “It took a lot of
courage,” the judge said, as she asked whether she could share the statement
with others for “educational” purposes. Again, these last two judges main
tained the formality of the hearing but physically moved away from the
bench and engaged in personal conversations to acknowledge the courage
and the fears of the victims. Moments such as this demonstrate how the VIS
can function as a persuasive tool that can help negotiate the power rela
tionships in the courtroom. Although these power dynamics may appear
strictly hierarchical at times, they really are not. The VIS functions as a
technology of power that negotiates disciplinary norms. When composed with
an underlying knowledge of the normative structures governing the persua
sive impact statement, the VIS becomes a disciplinary tool whose role is to
highlight the parameters within which the norms can be defined and then
perhaps subtly subverted.

Conclusion
Judges understand and respect that victims have the legislated right to
give an impact statement, and they certainly honor that right; however, they
also struggle to maintain not only their authority in the courtroom but also
their role within a larger institution that, to borrow from De Certeau’s
(1984) language, serves as a base from which external threats may be man
aged. The unpredictability of the emotional displays elicited by impact
statements is sometimes perceived as a threat to that authority and to that
institution. Judges then use the rhetoric of inevitability, citing sentencing
guidelines as being more restrictive than they actually might be in individ
ual cases, to give them the option to offset that threat. Victims, on the other
hand, see the impact statement as an opportunity to make themselves heard,
request particular sentences or punishments, and gain closure on the crime.
Victim advocates must negotiate the relationships between judges and
victims, not only by understanding judges’ preferences and comfort levels
with VISs but also by being honest with victims about the limitations of the
VIS and the potential emotional value for the victim. In negotiating these
relationships, they ease the tension between these two groups by helping
victims to adjust their expectations as well as to compose the most appro
priate statement, given the normative structures governing it and the room
for subtle subversion that such normative structures allow for and invite.
Inherent in each group’s interpretation of the right to give an impact
statement are the values and goals both of a system that seeks to highlight
the parameters within which the norms may be defined in relation to the
person or group cast as the other and of that other itself. Again, by refer
ring to a system that seeks to enforce parameters, we do not mean to say
that the relationship between judges and victims is necessarily adversarial
or even strictly hierarchical. Indeed, victim advocates have a lot of knowl
edge to impart to members of the court system, and judges do understand
that advocates have much to offer in the way of experience and resources.
The middle ground, therefore, lies in the negotiation afforded by the work
of the VIS itself and by those moments of mutual understanding that occur
when judges are moved by an impact statement or when judges listen
attentively, validate, and even express sympathy to the victim. The disci
plinary power of each group then fluctuates given a constellation of vari
ables. Thus, these relationships are far from being strictly hierarchical
although they may appear so. Although advocates must play on the terrain
imposed on them, they are able to control this terrain as well, and by using
the technologies of power afforded by the VIS to work within and against

the system, they use their discursive understanding to help empower the
victim.
Such studies as this one provide insight into important questions about
business and technical communication in the public arena. Concerned groups
must negotiate public policy, including interpretations of legislated rights and
limitations, to articulate and achieve their goals. Understanding how those
groups frame problems, define rhetorical exigencies, and get issues on the
table demands in-depth and often sustained investigation—investigation that
goes much beyond identifying various voices and articulated goals. The inter
action between these concerned groups, as we discovered, may take place in
a middle ground of negotiation, which is not immediately obvious to the
investigator. And as we experienced, one way for scholars of business and
technical communication and rhetoric to conduct such cases is to partner with
a community group involved in such negotiations. That community partner,
in turn, can help more widely disseminate the results and recommendations
of such studies so that research participants can increase their understanding
of each other and open up the dialogue. In our case, we also hope that our
study will reveal to advocates and victims successfully persuasive strategies
and tactics that enhance a VIS.
Finally, we have some suggestions for how graduate education, in par
ticular, in business and technical communication, might address the themes
and discoveries we found in our study:
1. We are long accustomed to audience analysis techniques that enforce hierar
chical descriptions, particularly within industry—someone is the boss, some
one a colleague, someone an employee. In our study, we found that victims
and their advocates were able to enter into negotiations with judges who ini
tially seemed to have much uniform authority and status. The legislated right
to give a VIS began that negotiation, but working within the norm also pro
vided a way not only to negotiate but also to resist the blanket imposition of
judicial authority or sentencing guidelines. Our graduate courses then need to
address those more nuanced relationships within the public arena.
2. Not only do graduate courses need to address those more nuanced relation
ships within the public arena, but they should also subsequently encourage
firsthand experiences within those arenas whenever possible. By encouraging
partnerships with organizations that deal with various forms of public policy,
whether it be in the legal or nonprofit arena, for example, students get to wit
ness policy in action versus or in addition to policy analyzed in the text.
3. We recommend that graduate students have the opportunity to experience the
application of theory as interpretive tools. Students often feel they must extend
theory to succeed in their courses or dissertations, but the case study approach,

such as ours, for example, demands that theory provide tools first to interpret
and then to contribute to theory. By starting with such unique case studies, we
can begin to understand the rhetorical nature of the public arena and the nego
tiations within the creation and application of public policy.
4. Business and technical communication provides tools for understanding the
persuasive elements of genres as they are applied in decision making and in
creating new documents, such as the legislated right to give a VIS and the
statement itself in negotiation with sentencing guidelines. These tools pro
vide an understanding of the relationship of text and its presentation, in this
case, in the courtroom. Moreover, expertise in business and technical com
munication should include the ability to interview and observe individuals
and constituencies as they interpret these texts.
5. Finally, sharing the results of our study with WATCH was one of the most
rewarding aspects of our project. Sharing research results with participants
and inviting their participation or feedback is also an important component
of activist research, as Barton (2004), Faber (1998), Grabill (2000), Schuster
(2006), and Waddell (1996) all explicitly or implicitly described. With this,
we feel that graduate courses in the research methods of business and tech
nical communication would benefit by addressing the complexities of shar
ing research results with research participants or the public.

Appendix A
Sample Interview Questions for Judges and for Advocates
Judges:
1. How long have you been a judge in Hennepin/Ramsey County?
2. How often do you see a victim impact statement (VIS) submitted to you
before a sentencing hearing? How often does the victim give allocution of
that statement at the hearing?
3. What factors do you commonly weigh before deciding on a sentence?
4. How important is the existence of a VIS in the context of all the other fac
tors that influence your decision? Which is the most important factor in
deciding on a sentence?
5. Do you give more weight to a victim who gives allocution of that VIS at the
hearing itself? Or does it matter?
6. In considering a VIS, do you consider separately the victim’s statement of
the emotional impact of the crime and the victim’s opinion of the kind and
degree of sentence that the defendant should receive? If you do consider sep
arately the victim’s statement of the emotional impact of the crime and the
victim’s opinion of the kind and degree of sentence that the defendant
should receive, which carries more weight with you? The emotional appeal
or the reaction to a possible sentence?
(continued)

Appendix A (continued)
7. Are there universal standards or professional guidelines that help you deter
mine how much weight to give the VIS? Over time, have you developed
your own standards or guidelines that help you determine how much weight
to give the VIS? And would you share those with me?
8. Could you recall for me a VIS that made a particular impression on you?
And why?
9. Is there anything else that you would like to share with me about the felony/
gross misdemeanor domestic violence courtroom, the sentencing decisions
that you must make, and/or VISs?
Advocates:
1. Could you describe how you have worked with victims in the past to develop
VISs? What tools and guidelines do you provide them?
2. Generally how have you observed that victim input is gathered by your
office or organization, by the prosecutor’s office, or by probation?
3. What do you think motivates victims to submit a VIS? What might make
them reluctant? Who do you think that a victim who writes an impact state
ment perceives the audience to be?
4. Do you think that it is more important for the victim to express the emo
tional impact of the crime or to express an opinion as to the kind and degree
of the sentence? Or both? Generally which of these two purposes are victims
more successful in accomplishing?
5. How often do victims elect not only to write an impact statement but also
to attend and speak at the sentencing hearing? Do you think that it’s
important for a victim to attend the sentencing hearing—and do you urge
them to do so?
6. In your experience, if a victim elects not to attend a hearing and to give allo
cution, why does the victim choose not to do so?
7. How much weight do you think judges give to VISs? In terms of the other
factors that the judge must weigh in determining a sentence, which factor do
you think is most important?
8. In your opinion, what features must a persuasive VIS have? Could you share
with me the description of any VIS that you think had a particular impact on
the judge—in terms of expressing the emotional impact of the crime or in
influencing the kind and degree of sentence or both?
9. Is there anything else you would like to share with me in terms of your expe
rience in working with victims in general? Or in submitting VISs? Or in giv
ing allocution at a sentencing hearing?

Appendix B
Observation Form
Your Name:
Case Number:
Offense:
Defendant:

Date:
Judge:
Advocate:
Relationship to Victim:

Sentence:
I.

How was the VIS presented in court (circle all that apply)?
a. Read by the victim or family member in the hearing
b. Read by the county attorney/prosecutor in hearing
c. Read by advocate in hearing
d. Submitted in writing before the hearing
e. Other ____________________
II. Was it your impression that the VIS was offered to (circle all that apply)
a. argue for a particular sentence or treatment plan
b. bring closure to the emotional effect of the crime on the victim
c. give the victim a sense that justice is being done
d. other____________________________________
III. Summarize the content of the VIS, if it was read or described during the hearing.
Be sure to include any specific requests made by the victim.
IV. How would you describe the demeanor of the judge in listening to and
responding to the VIS?
a. supportive (e.g., welcoming, agreeing)
b. courteous (e.g., attentive, interested)
c. businesslike (e.g., routine, impersonal)
d. strict (e.g., bureaucratic, firm, stress power of the judge)
e. condescending (e.g., patronizing, demeaning, sexist)
f. harsh (e.g., nasty, abrasive, scolding, contemptuous)
g. other:
V. What verbal statements did the judge make toward the victim or the person
reading the impact statement that might contribute to your descriptions of judi
cial demeanor? For example, did the judge engage in dialogue with the victim,
thank the victim, respond to any specifics of the impact statement, mention
specifics of the impact statement to the defendant? Please describe:
VI. What nonverbal gestures did the judge make toward the victim or the person
reading the impact statement that might contribute to your descriptions of judi
cial demeanor? For example, facial expressions (maintains eye contact, smiles,
frowns), posture (faces victim, sits at attention), mannerisms (nods head, looks
down at papers), tone of voice (harsh, soft). Please describe:
(continued)

Appendix B (continued)
VII. Did the judge acknowledge that the VIS affected his or her decision in the sen
tence for the defendant?
No_______
Yes______
Please summarize what the judge said, particularly about how the sentence
might have been affected by the VIS:
VIII. Describe anything that the defendant or the defense attorney said on the
defendant’s behalf (particularly in response to the impact statement):
IX. Describe any reaction to the impact statement from the gallery or anything the
judge did to maintain control of the courtroom during the sentencing:
X. Record below any other impression that you think might be important:

Notes
1. Results of this study were presented at the Law and Society Association Conference in
Baltimore, MD, in July 2006 and at the College Composition and Communication Conference
in New York City in March 2007.
2. We identify the speaker of a quote according to the following key: If the speaker is a
judge, we identify the district, either the second judicial district (2JD) or the fourth judicial
district (4JD), and the random number we assigned that judge (in this case, number 6). If the
speaker is an advocate (A), we identify the county, either Hennepin (H) or Ramsey (R); the
type, either system (S) or community (C); and the random number we assigned that advocate.
3. WATCH volunteers used our observation form to record their impressions of impact
statements given during sentencing hearings. But because we were not able to control for the
volunteers’ varying degrees of experience (e.g., observers’ experience ranged from that of new
student interns to that of the executive director of WATCH), we have grounded our findings on
our interviews and our own observations.
4. The Minnesota sentencing guidelines grid can be found at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/.
5. Statements and observations from the hearings are noted by the date alone.
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